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George-Marios Angeletos initiated the session by briefly responding to the 
discussants’ comments. Both Robert King and Christian Hellwig had wondered if the 
paper’s informational imperfection is the most relevant and quantitatively important 
propagation channel. Angeletos pointed out that the authors are not yet ready to make 
quantitative statements. Nevertheless, he discussed the key parameters of the model: the 
elasticity of substitution across islands and the price elasticity of demand of a particular 
good. The first parameter specifies the strength of trade links across islands and is a key 
determinant of the degree of complementarity, capturing the sensitivity of profits to 
aggregate demand. The second parameter pins down the monopoly power and is an 
important determinant of the cross-sectional properties of the model. In response to 
Hellwig’s point that parametrizing the model involves a tension between 
complementarity and the response to idiosyncratic shocks, Angeletos argued that by 
generalizing preferences to separate the two parameters, one obtains a model in which the 
sensitivity to idiosyncratic shocks need not be tightly connected to the sensitivity to 
expectations of aggregate activity. Regarding the paper’s informational structure, 
Angeletos noted that the noisy public signal is only a modeling device, not essential to 
the questions addressed in the paper. He stressed that the noise in the model is not the 
error in a public signal. Rather, the noise is the agents’ correlated errors in forecasting 
economic activity. Finally, Angeletos urged the audience to take a more flexible approach 
to modeling information frictions, lest we fail to see the forest for the trees. He argued 
that specific information structures could be misleading by delivering specific results that 
are not robust to more general information structures. The essential result of the theory 
presented in this paper is that individual activity responds to (known) individual 
fundamentals and to expectations of aggregate activity. The micro data provides 
information about the former component, while data on forecasts of economic activity 
could offer information about the latter.   
Jennifer La’O continued with a discussion of the cyclical properties of the labor 
wedge. Hellwig had pointed out that although informational shocks generate the desired 
counter-cyclicality of the labor wedge, the productivity shocks work in the opposite 
direction, thereby yielding a pro-cyclical labor wedge unconditionally. La’O argued that 
since the main drivers of the business cycle in the model are the noise shocks, not the 
productivity shocks, the labor wedge does remain counter-cyclical. In response to King’s 
comment about the fragility of the paper’s welfare implications, La’O stressed that 
monopoly power only affects the level of output, which can be overcome with non-
contingent subsidies to output. Since monopoly power does not affect the strength of 
strategic complementarities (which is determined by trade links across islands), it does 
not affect the informational externalities that drive fluctuations. Therefore, she 
maintained that the informational structure does not introduce any additional inefficiency.  
Hyun Shin pointed out that it had been assumed that the coefficient measuring the 
degree of strategic complementarity should be between zero and one. He wondered what 
would be the consequences of having that coefficient be greater than one, in a well-
defined model where the actions of agents are suitably bounded.  Elias Albagli wondered what role asset prices could play in aggregating and 
conveying information about aggregate activity. 
Chris Carroll was enthusiastic about distinguishing responses to individual vs. 
aggregate conditions. But in his view, the real mystery was why people seem to respond a 
lot more to the aggregate signals than might seem sensible. He cited his recent work on 
consumption, in which he finds that the magnitude of permanent shocks at the individual 
household level is roughly 100 times as large as the variance of shocks at the aggregate 
level, which suggests that people ought to pay very little attention to aggregate shocks, at 
least if there is any cost of obtaining that information.  
Nobu Kiyotaki pointed out that the paper deals with disagreement across agents 
regarding the aggregate state, rather than with uncertainty, as measured by the degree of 
confidence any one agent has about their own forecast. He pointed to the New York 
Fed’s work on inflation data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, which 
distinguishes between dispersion in expected inflation and inflation uncertainty for each 
respondent.  
Michael Woodford took up Hellwig’s connection to papers on asymmetric 
information written in the 1970s and 1980s. He noted that the earlier literature assumed 
that asymmetries of information had something to do with the structure of the world: 
certain things were not perfectly observable by certain agents because of actual barriers 
to the information flow. To verify such an assumption, one would need, as King had 
suggested, to measure the noise in the available public signals and to explain the source 
of that noise. But noisy signals are difficult to justify in the case of monetary policy, for 
example, since the Fed gives timely and precise statements about its actions. As an 
alternative, Woodford pointed to the recent literature that focuses on limits to information 
processing. This approach, explored in papers by Sims and Woodford, among others, 
generates noise from the inattentiveness of individual agents. The way to discipline the 
theory is to have a parsimonious theory of what agents optimally choose to pay attention 
to, rather than to model the structural barriers to information that agents must live with.    
Angeletos found the different formalizations of the information structure as highly 
complementary. Many of these alternative formalizations are just specific restrictions on 
expectations; but once one reaches a representation of how activity depends on 
expectations of activity, he claimed that most of these formalizations look similar. He 
agreed with the criticism that it is hard to justify incomplete information about exogenous 
innovations to monetary policy. However, he argued that information about real shocks is 
widely dispersed, and it becomes interesting to see how monetary policy responds to 
shocks for which agents have dispersed information. The companion paper with La’O 
(2008) highlights that the response of monetary policy in such an environment changes 
the way in which the economy responds to these shocks in the first place.   
John Geanakoplos recalled that one focus of the early literature was determining 
the extent to which having more information was beneficial. He noted the paper by 
Martin Hellwig (1982), in which people paid attention to prices in making their decisions, 
but they did not extract from prices all the information that could be extracted. He also 
pointed to a paper co-authored with Dubey and Shubik (1987) in which if agents had 
different levels of information about the state of the economy, and had to commit to 
quantities first, as in a Shapley-Shubik (1977) game, then even in a rational expectations 
equilibrium without any strategic complementarities, having a better signal mattered a lot. He suggested that the authors drop the symmetry of the model, to explore the extent 
to which having better information matters in this model as well.  
Phillipe Aghion built on Geanakoplos’s point, suggesting that the authors make 
information endogenous, allowing agents to invest in learning. The authors could explore 
the link between the degree of competitive power and the incentives to invest in better 
information, thereby generating predictions about the link between market structure and 
the equilibrium amount of information.   
Angeletos agreed that the endogeneity of information was an important point 
which the authors would explore further. He went on to highlight that in this model, the 
only thing that agents can do with better information is to update their forecast about 
aggregate activity. However, the role of learning is limited, since precisely when noise 
has the biggest impact on the business cycle (namely when complementarities are 
strongest), the forecast errors will be smallest, and hence any learning that may take place 
through prices or macroeconomic data will be least useful.  
Ken Rogoff ended with a provocation regarding our perceptions of reasonable 
assumptions about the economy. He was struck by the contrast between the current paper 
and the papers related to the financial crisis in the current volume. He pointed out that 
historically, the truly serious business cycles have always been associated with big 
financial problems and he noted the theoretical work of Bernanke, Gertler, Kiyotaki, 
Moore, and others, which tries to model these financial amplification mechanisms. He 
wondered if the current RBC/New Keynesian frameworks are only suitable for small 
cycles, while missing the big waves: Is the RBC framework, with its elegant, simplifying 
assumptions that wave off issues in the financial markets, merely modeling “white noise” 
that we can filter out when looking at the big swings? Is the profession rethinking these 
central assumptions?  
Angeletos found the RBC framework useful in revealing important amplification 
and noise effects that generate fluctuations even in a stark framework with no 
inefficiencies. He also felt that the conceptual point of the paper, namely that information 
frictions are an important way to generate uncertainty about aggregate activity, is highly 
suitable for thinking about financial markets and crises.  
 
 